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Abstract
This paper studies the eﬀects of international integration of capital mar-
kets in a world where countries diﬀer in their labor market institutions: one
country has a perfectly competitive labor market while the other is unionized.
We show that workers should favor autarky in the unionized country, but op-
pose it in the non unionized country and vice versa for owners of capital.
Aggregate gains from integration, however, are negative. We also show that,
under capital mobility, an increase in relative bargaining power of unions does
not always improve workers’ welfare.
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O v e rt h ep a s td e c a d e ,t h ei n c r e a s ei nc a p i t a lﬂows between industrialized countries
has been about four time as large as the increase in trade ﬂows. This large increase
in international capital ﬂows and the speed with which capital markets of industrial
countries have become integrated represent one of the most striking recent changes
in the world economy. However, economists have not yet reached a common stance
with respect to costs and beneﬁts of capital markets’ liberalization (see, e.g., Rodrik
1997, Bhagwati 1998, and Stiglitz 2004).
The contribution of this paper is to uncover the eﬀect of world integration of cap-
ital markets on factor incomes and welfare, when factor returns between countries
diﬀer due to diﬀerent degrees of unionization of labor markets.
In recent years a number of authors have investigated the interaction between
labor unions and foreign direct investment (FDI), mostly looking at the factors
inﬂuencing multinationals’ choice of location and at the welfare consequences for
the host country (see, among others, Skaksen and Sorensen 2001, Zhao 2001 and
Naylor and Santoni 2003). We abstract from FDI, and provide a simple formal
model to analyze the distributional eﬀects of international competition for capital
services between countries.1 Thus, our set up diﬀers substantially from those used
in the unionization-FDI literature mentioned above, and is closer in spirit to early
literature on factor market distortions and their impact for trade (see, e.g., Kemp
and Negishi 1970 and Eaton and Panagariya 1979).
The conventional approach in the literature, to explain international factor
movements, is to assume perfect competition in all markets and account for diﬀer-
ences in factor returns by appealing to diﬀerences in fundamentals (such as factor
endowments, technologies or preferences). However, diﬀerences in market structure
may also explain why factor returns vary across countries. In our model there are
1Although FDI inﬂows have considerably increased since mid 1980s’, FDI inﬂows largely un-
derstate the extent to which foreign capital penetrates domestic markets. See, e.g., the UN World
Investment Report, 2007.
1two countries, identical in all dimensions except for unions’ bargaining power. Sym-
metry allows us to focus on how divergences in the labor market structure across
countries, per se, aﬀect income levels and their distribution between capital owners
and workers when capital movements are liberalized. To simplify the analysis, we
assume that in one of the two countries there is perfect competition in the labor
market (that is union power approaches zero), while in the other there is eﬃcient
bargaining over wages and employment between unions and ﬁrms. Typically, in a
closed economy, suﬃciently strong unions are able, through eﬃcient bargaining, to
inﬂuence the distribution of income to the beneﬁt of workers and at the expense
of capital owners; while returns to capital become lower than the marginal produc-
tivity of capital. Accordingly, when international factor movements are liberalized,
capital ﬂows from the highly unionized country into the less unionized country (in
our case, to the perfectly competitive country): in the unionized country output
and workers’ income decrease while capitalists’ income increases, and vice versa in
the non unionized country.
With ﬁxed factors’ supply and full employment, unions are not able to inﬂuence
resource allocation at the autarkic equilibrium, and given that both countries have
the same endowments and technology, the marginal productivity of capital is iden-
tical across countries. Hence, allocation of capital across countries is eﬃcient under
autarky. Allowing for capital mobility triggers ineﬃcient capital ﬂo w sa n dl e a d st o
a decrease in world output. Also, workers’ share of world output and income per
capita at the world level decrease. Therefore, international capital mobility would
not beneﬁt workers, even if the gains obtained by capital owners were eﬃciently
r e d i s t r i b u t e da m o n ga l li n d i v i d u a l s ,b o t ha tt h ew o r l dl e v e la n di nt h eu n i o n i z e d
country. The paper also addresses the issue of the desirable level of union bargaining
power when capital is internationally mobile. It is shown that there is a critical level
of union power above which an increase in union strength reduces union members’
income.
These second best results are at odds with the prediction of standard models in
2which capital mobility leads to overall welfare gains, and may explain unions’ resis-
tance towards globalization in a world with disparate workers’ bargaining strength.
I n t e r e s t i n g l y ,t h es a m ee ﬀects would occur if we assume perfectly competitive labor
markets and a redistributive capital tax, since in our set up the degree of union-
ization can be interpreted as a tax on capital returns. Hence, our work can also
be related to the literature on tax competition, redistribution and capital mobility
(see, e.g., Cremer et al. 1996 and Wilson et al. 2004).
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the model. In
Section 3 we contrast autarky and perfect capital mobility. In Section 4 we explore
the eﬀects of capital movements, and Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
There are two countries, A and B, identical in everything except for union bargain-
ing power. In each country there are ¯ K capitalists and ¯ N workers, each exogenously
supplying one unit of their respective factor service. Both countries produce the
same single good, taken as numeraire, with identical technologies. In each country
t h e r ei sal a r g en u m b e rM of identical ﬁrms, each producing yj units of output
under perfect competition, according to the production function yj = F(kj,l j),
j = A,B,w h e r e :kj and lj represent, respectively, the units of capital and labor
used in production by a ﬁrm in country j;a n dF is a standard increasing, and
concave-homogeneous of degree one function in kj and lj, with a constant elasticity
of substitution σ ∈ [1,∞).2 Capital is rented at the perfectly competitive rental
rate rj, while wages and employment are determined through eﬃcient bargaining
between unions and ﬁrms. Unions are ﬁrm speciﬁc, each one representing a ﬁxed
number of workers, nj ≡ ¯ N/M.3 We assume that workers are also members of pen-
2Accordingly, it is important to keepi nm i n df o rf u r t h e rr e s u l t st h a tFk,F l > 0, while Fkk,F ll <









3In many developed countries’ labor markets wage bargaining occurs at increasing decentralized
levels. Katz (1993), among others, reports evidence of the decetralization in the structure of
3sion funds, and the latter diversify their portfolio, owning an equal amount of every
domestic ﬁrm.4 Accordingly, at a symmetric equilibrium, each worker receives 1/ ¯ N
of every ﬁrm dividends out of his/her contributions. For each union the objective
is to maximize the income of their members (wage and dividend earnings), while
ﬁr m s ’o b j e c t i v ei st om a x i m i z ep r o ﬁts.
We consider a two-stage game and assume that in the ﬁrst stage ﬁrms pre-
commit to a given level of capital (kj) knowing that the wage, wj,a n de m p l o y -
ment, lj, will be negotiated afterwards, in the second stage of the game. To obtain
the eﬃcient bargaining solution we solve the generalized Nash bargaining problem,
where the ﬁrm and union returns are net of their respective fallback (that is, net
of the level of their returns in case no agreement is reached and production does
not take place). Since, in case of disagrement, ﬁrms’ return is −rjkj and workers’
return is the income from their private pension assets, wj and lj are the solutions
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where 1 >γ j ≥ 0 represents country j’s union bargaining power. The solution to
this problem is: lj = nj and wj = γjF(kj,n j) 1
nj. By anticipating this bargaining
outcome, the representative ﬁrm will choose to commit to the level of capital that
maximizes proﬁts, (1−γj)F(kj,n j)−rjkj, which leads to the ﬁrst order condition:
rj =( 1− γj)Fk(kj,n j).5 Using the Euler relations for the production function, it
is easy to obtain the equilibrium levels of proﬁts: (1 − γj)Fl(kj,n j)nj. Hence, at
the symmetric equilibrium, income per worker becomes: w∗j = γj F(kj,nj)
nj +( 1−
collective bargaining in most developed economies since the early 1980s.
4Private pension funds (and other means of private old-age maintenance) are particularly wide-
spread among workers in anglo-saxon countries; while in many other countries, inside and outside
the OECD, private funded pensions are increasingly taking over. The strong home bias displayed
by pension and other institutional assets in OECD countries is widely documented. See, e.g.,
Davis (2002).
5Identical results would have been obtained had we considered that unions and ﬁrms only nego-
tiate over wages, the level of employment having been previously ﬁxed by ﬁrms. This is a special
scenario of the right to manage model with a reverse timing, where ﬁrms chooses employment
before bargaining takes place. See Lingens (2007), that rationalize this approach for countries
where, due to substantial ﬁring costs, employment cannot be adjusted quickly.
4γj)Fl(kj,n j).
At a symmetric equilibrium, Kj ≡ Mkj and Lj ≡ Mlj = ¯ N represent countries’
total capital and labor services utilization. Exploiting the property of homogene-
ity of the production function, aggregate output is given by Y j = F(Kj,L j) and
equilibrium values of income, per capitalist and per worker, can be written as
r
j =( 1− γ
j)FK(K




























Note that when γj =0we recover the case of perfectly competitive markets; the
rental rate of capital and the income per worker corresponding to their marginal
products and, given the joint assumptions of constant returns and perfect com-
petition, zero equilibrium proﬁts.6 Compared to the perfectly competitive case,
worker’s income is above its marginal product and the return to capital is below its
marginal product. Indeed for ﬁxed amounts of capital and output, unions, through
eﬃc i e n tb a r g a i n i n g ,a r ea b l et oi n ﬂuence the distribution of income to the beneﬁt
of workers at the expense of lower returns to capital.7
3 Equilibrium: Autarky vs Capital Mobility
In this section we examine the eﬀects of movements from autarky to perfect capital
mobility between countries with diﬀerent union power. Although we focus on labor
6In fact, with γj =0the labor market is characterized by a monopsony; with wages equal to
zero and proﬁts per worker corresponding to the marginal productivity of labor. However, since
proﬁts are distributed to workers, their income is exactly identical to that obtained in the case of
a perfectly competitive labor market.
7Note that, unions’ power always leads to positive proﬁts and the workers’ bargained wage is
larger than the perfectly competitive wage (Fl) when union strength is suﬃciently strong, i.e.,
γ>F ll/F.
5market distortions, identical results would have been obtained had we, instead, con-
sidered a distortion originating from a tax on capital income or from monopolistic
competition.8
3.1. Autarky. At the autarkic equilibrium Kj = ¯ K,w i t hj = A,B,a n d
Y A = F( ¯ K, ¯ N)=Y B. Two results are now worth emphasizing, for further
comparison with the case of international capital mobility. First, world output








,w i t hKA +KB =2¯ K, is maximized when the con-
dition FA
K = FB
K is satisﬁed.9 Since technologies and labor endowments are com-
pletely symmetric across countries, KA = KB = ¯ K represents the world eﬃcient
allocation and, therefore, world output is maximized at the autarkic equilibrium.
Second, although the two countries have the same aggregate output, the income
distribution between workers and capital owners diﬀers, since it depends on the
union bargaining power. Since capital and output are ﬁxed under autarky, we can
immediately see, from (2) and (4), that the eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nγ on workers’
income and their respective share is positive. Hence, i nac l o s e de c o n o m ywhere
ﬁxed endowments of inputs are fully utilized, the higher the union power the bet-
ter oﬀ are the workers as they can appropriate a larger share of income. If capital
movements are liberalized, however, capital owners have the option to invest capital
abroad and, as we shall see below, the impact of increased union power on workers’
welfare may become negative.
3.2. Capital Mobility. We assume that capital owners can invest their endow-
ments in both countries, even though those capital movements are not accompanied
by physical movements of capitalists. Under perfect capital mobility, in addition to
(1) and (2), a no-arbitrage condition in the world capital market (rA = rB) needs to
8Assume that the tax revenue is redistributed to the workers as a lump sum transfer, and that
the government balances its budget. Alternatively, consider the existence of a ﬁnal good, produced
out of a continuum of identical intermediate products with a constant elasticity of substitution
1/γj, and monopolistic competition in the intermediate sector. Then, equilibrium relationships
(1)-(4) still apply, where γj denotes the tax rate on capital returns or, alternatively, the market
power of the representative monopolistic ﬁrm.







6be satisﬁed together with the world capital market clearing condition. Accordingly,
















B =2¯ K.( 6 )
It can be checked that if γA = γB then the solution KA = KB = ¯ K would follow,
which is identical to the solution under autarky. Indeed, if both countries shared
the same union power, the rental rates of capital under autarky would be identical
across countries and there would be no incentives for capital movements. Hence,
capital movements are induced by diﬀerences in union power: under autarky, rental
rates of capital are lower in the more unionized country, inducing outﬂows of capital
from the more to the less unionized country.
Hereafter, we assume that country A is the more unionized country and, to
simplify matters, we assume that country B’s labor market is perfectly competitive.
This leads to,
γ
A = γ and γ
B =0 .( 7 )
In the appendix we show conditions under which a unique equilibrium
¡
KA,KB¢
exists, and satisﬁes KB > ¯ K>K A. Accordingly, capital moves from the more to
the less unionized country.
4E ﬀects of Capital Mobility
In this section we analyze the eﬀects of capital mobility on world output and income
distribution between countries, and examine the distribution of income between
workers and capitalists. We also study the eﬀects of changes in unions’ bargaining
power on equilibrium, under capital mobility.
4.1. Country and World Income. Using (5) and (7), it is immediate to
check that the equilibrium allocation under capital mobility implies FA
K >F B
K,s o
that the eﬃcient allocation condition is no longer veriﬁed and, thus, world output







K > 0.( 8 )
Therefore, the decrease in KA resulting from allowing for capital mobility im-
plies that world output is reduced. To evaluate the eﬀect of capital mobility on
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.D i ﬀerentiating the latter with respect to KA,













B − ¯ K
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> 0.( 9 )
This expression takes a value zero at the autarkic solution, since FA
K = FB
K and
KB = ¯ K, but becomes positive as soon as capital mobility is allowed. Hence, the
decrease in KA implies that the unionized country experiences a loss in national
income. We can therefore establish the following.
. Under capital mobility, income in the unionized country and in the world is
lower than under autarky.

















B − ¯ K
¢
< 0.( 1 0 )
Thus, as capital ﬂows out from country A, income in the competitive country in-
creases with capital mobility. Output in the less unionized country increases; how-
ever, at the expense of an even higher decrease of output in the more unionized
country, leading to lower world output. Accordingly, diﬀerent degrees of distortions
across countries induce ineﬃcient capital movements.
4.2. Distribution of Income between Workers and Capital. When
international capital movements are liberalized, the marginal productivity of la-
bor(capital) increases(decreases) in country B, since the utilization of capital ser-
vices in this country is higher under capital mobility than under autarky. Accord-
8ingly, by use of (1), (2) and (7), wages in country B increase, while the rental rate
of capital decreases. In contrast, in the unionized country A, utilization of capital
services is smaller under capital mobility and capitalists’ income increases; while
workers’ income decreases, since it is composed by wages and proﬁts which are both
increasing in KA.
Since some workers (capitalists) beneﬁt, namely those from country B (country
A), while others are hurt by liberalization of capital movements, it is important
to establish whether capital mobility favors distribution of world income towards
capital owners or workers. Workers’ income share of world output, sT
L,i sg i v e nb y
sT





L. After straightforward calculations, and



































Since capital share in country B is higher than in country A (sB
K >s A
K),10 the
share of workers’ income at the world level decreases when KA decreases. Hence,
liberalization of capital movements brings about an increase in the share of world
output of capital owners at the expense of workers’ share of world output.
4.3. Changes in Bargaining Power Totally diﬀerentiating (5) and (6) with








KK +( 1− γ)FA
KK
< 0.( 1 2 )
An increase in union power in country A widens the diﬀerence in returns of capital
across countries under autarky, encouraging capital movement into country B even
further and causing a decrease in utilization of capital services in country A.B y
use of (8)-(10), the eﬀect of a change in γ on national income in both countries and
10Using (4) and (7), note that sB
K − sA













F j > 0.
Hence, capital movements from the unionized country A to country B further increase sB
K − sA
K.
























< 0.( 1 3 )
Under autarky, capital and labor utilization in each country is ﬁxed at equilibrium
and, therefore, output and national income are constant and unaﬀected by changes
in union power. Expressions (13) show, however, that under capital mobility a
higher union power implies a net loss in national income in the unionized coun-
try and in the world (and a net gain in the competitive country). The following
proposition summarizes this result.
. Under capital mobility, income in the unionized country and in the world is
negatively correlated with union bargaining power.
Proposition 2 implies that the unionized country and the world are worse oﬀ
when worker bargaining strength increases, due to the higher distortion in the
unionized country and the induced ineﬃcient capital movements. The competitive
country, however, is better oﬀ f o rh i g h e rv a l u e so fγ.
To study whether an increase in union power can, after all, beneﬁtw o r k e r si n
the unionized country, we diﬀerentiate the workers’ income function deﬁn e di n( 2 )
with respect to γ. However, in contrast to the case of autarky, we now have to take














,( 1 4 )
where dKA
dγ < 0 is given by (12). Using (2) we obtain ∂w∗A
∂γ = FK(KA, ¯ N)KA








KA − (1 − γ)FA
KK
´
> 0. Expression (14) reﬂects the fact that an
increase in γ aﬀects workers’ income through two channels. First, there is a direct
channel, which raises workers’ income share for a given level of capital and output.
The eﬀect working through this channel, being represented by the ﬁrst term in
(14), is positive and is analogous to what occurs under autarky where capital and
output do not change with changes in γ. Second, there is an indirect channel linked
to the capital outﬂow triggered by the increase in union power; the latter, being
10represented by the second term in (14), is negative. Hence, in contrast to autarky,
where an increase in union power always increases workers’ income, under capital
mobility this result may be reversed: whether an increase in union power is able to
increase workers’ income at all under capital mobility depends on the overall sign
of (14). We establish the following result.
. Under capital mobility, there is a threshold value γ∗ above (below) which
workers’ income in the unionized country decreases (increases) with γ.
Proof: See Appendix
Accordingly, under internationally mobile capital, unions that are willing to
maximize workers’ income face a critical level of bargaining power, γ∗; Pushing
their bargaining power beyond that level will only hurt workers.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Labor unions fear international markets’ liberalization, their main concern being
that workers of the trading partner countries should be granted essential rights,
preferably similar to those enjoyed by home workers. They claim that this is aimed
at beneﬁtting all workers, the struggle being between workers and capital owners
around the world and not between workers from diﬀerent countries. By contrast,
many of those who are in favor of liberalization of world economic transactions
claim that unions aim merely at protecting their members against competition
from workers of less regulated countries. Our work shed some light on these issues
and provide arguments on both sides of the debate.
We have shown that, if one country is unionized (with eﬃcient bargaining over
wages and employment) while the other is not, then, world output, workers’ share
of world income and income of unionized workers are higher under autarky, whereas
workers from the non unionized country beneﬁt from capital movement liberaliza-
tion.
With capital internationally mobile, however, if the non unionized country were
11to converge to the same degree of unionization of the other country no factor move-
ments would occur at equilibrium; hence output would not be reduced and workers
of the unionized country would not lose from liberalization. Accordingly, for work-
ers in unionized countries, it may make sense to push towards achieving, prior to
integration, similar levels of bargaining strength around the world. In contrast, un-
der asymmetric unionization and integrated capital markets, if workers’ bargaining
strength in the unionized country is relatively high, a reduction in union power
actually beneﬁts union members, as it limits the size of capital ﬂows out of the
unionized country and its negative eﬀects on workers’ income.
Finally, let us remark that, to simplify the analysis and to establish a ﬁrst set of
relevant results, we have abstracted from considering unemployment. Our conjec-
ture is that the existence of unemployment in the unionized country would reinforce
the outﬂows of capital; the marginal productivity of capital in the unionized coun-
try would be lower and, thereby, the diﬀerential in capital return across countries
would be higher. However, the ﬁnal eﬀects on factor returns, employment and out-
put may depend on the way unemployment is generated and on the way unions and
bargaining is modelled. These issues are left for future research.
Appendix
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> 0. Then, under capital mobility
there is a unique solution
¡
KA,KB¢
satisfying KB > ¯ K>K A.
By use of (6) and given the assumption in (7), (5) can be written as Z(KA) ≡
FK
¡






, and a solution for KA satisﬁes Z(KA)=0 .
Given the assumptions on the production function, Z is a continuous increasing


















Z(KA) > 0.M o r e o v e r , Z( ¯ K)=FK
¡ ¯ K, ¯ N
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− (1 − γ)FK
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> 0; therefore, since Z(KA) is an increasing function of KA,i tc a n
only become zero for KA < ¯ K.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n3







































< 0 for γ>γ ∗.
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